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Abstract. We generalize a yes-no model of influence in a social network with a single step of
mutual influence to a framework with iterated influence. Each agent makes an acceptance-rejection
decision and has an inclination to say either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Due to influence by others, an agent’s
decision may be different from his original inclination. Such a transformation from the inclinations
to the decisions is represented by an influence function. We analyze the decision process in which the
mutual influence does not stop after one step but iterates. Any classical influence function can be
coded by a stochastic matrix, and a generalization leads to stochastic influence functions. We apply
Markov chains theory to the analysis of stochastic binary influence functions. We deliver a general
analysis of the convergence of an influence function and then study the convergence of particular
influence functions. This model is compared with the Asavathiratham model of influence. We also
investigate models based on aggregation functions. In this context, we give a complete description
of terminal classes, and show that the only terminal states are the consensus states if all players
are weakly essential.
JEL Classification: C7, D7
Keywords: social network, influence, stochastic influence function, convergence, terminal
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1 Introduction
The concepts of interaction and influence on networks are studied in several scientific
fields, e.g., in psychology, sociology, economics, mathematics. In the game-theoretical
literature, one-step models of influence appeared already more than fifty years ago. For a
short survey of cooperative and noncooperative approaches to influence, see, e.g., Grabisch
and Rusinowska (2010d). Although the contribution of the one-step interaction models to
the analysis of influence issues is significant, it is very important to study dynamic aspects
of influence, since in real-life situations we frequently face the iteration of influence. An
overview of dynamic models of imitation and social influence is provided, e.g., in Jackson
(2008); see also Golub and Jackson (2010).
The present paper deals with iteration of an influence model originally introduced as
a one-step influence framework. Before focusing on the model in question, first we survey
the literature on dynamic models of interaction and influence.
⋆ This research project is supported by the National Agency for Research (Agence Nationale de la Recherche),
Reference: ANR-09-BLAN-0321-01.
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1.1 Literature on dynamic models of interaction and influence
One of the leading models of opinion formation has been introduced by DeGroot (1974).
In his model, individuals in a society start with initial opinions on a subject. The inter-
action patterns are described by a stochastic matrix whose entry on row j and column
k represents the weight ‘that agent j places on the current belief of agent k in form-
ing j’s belief for the next period’. The beliefs are updated over time. Results in Markov
chain theory are easily adapted to the model. Several works in the network literature deal
with the DeGroot model and its variations. In particular, Jackson (2008) and Golub and
Jackson (2010) examine a model, in which agents communicate in a social network and
update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of their neighbors’ opinions.
One of the issues in the DeGroot framework that these authors deal with concerns neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for convergence of the social influence matrix and reaching
a consensus; see additionally Berger (1981). Jackson (2008) also examines the speed of
convergence of beliefs, and Golub and Jackson (2010) analyze in the context of the De-
Groot model whether consensus beliefs are “correct”, i.e., whether the beliefs converge
to the right probability, expectation, etc. The authors consider a sequence of societies,
where each society is strongly connected and convergent, and described by its updating
matrix. In each social network of the sequence, the belief of each player converges to the
consensus limit belief. There is a true state of nature, and the sequence of networks is
wise if the consensus limit belief converges in probability to the true state as the number
of societies grows.
Several other generalizations of the DeGroot model can be found in the literature,
e.g., models in which the updating of beliefs can vary in time and circumstances; see
e.g. DeMarzo et al. (2003), Krause (2000), Lorenz (2005), Friedkin and Johnsen (1990,
1997). In particular, in the model of information transmission and opinion formation by
DeMarzo et al. (2003), the agents in a network try to estimate some unknown parameter,
which allows updating to vary over time, i.e., an agent may place more or less weight
on his own belief over time. The authors study the case of multidimensional opinions, in
which each agent has a vector of beliefs. They show that, in fact, the individuals’ opinions
can often be well approximated by a one-dimensional line, where an agent’s position on
the line determines his position on all issues. Friedkin and Johnsen (1990, 1997) study
a similar framework, in which social attitudes depend on the attitudes of neighbors and
evolve over time. In their model, agents start with initial attitudes and then mix in some
of their neighbors’ recent attitudes with their starting attitudes.
Also other works in sociology related to influence are worth mentioning, e.g., the
eigenvector-like notions of centrality and prestige (Katz (1953), Bonacich (1987), Bonacich
and Lloyd (2001)), and models of social influence and persuasion by French (1956) and
Harary (1959); see also Wasserman and Faust (1994). A sociological model of interac-
tions on networks is also presented in Conlisk (1976); see also Conlisk (1978, 1992) and
Lehoczky (1980). Conlisk introduces the interactive Markov chain, in which every entry
in a state vector at each time represents the fraction of the population with some at-
tribute. The matrix depends on the current state vector, i.e., the current social structure
is taken into account for evolution in sociological dynamics. In Granovetter (1978) thresh-
old models of collective behavior are discussed. These are models in which agents have
two alternatives and the costs and benefits of each depend on how many other agents
choose which alternative. The author focuses on the effect of the individual thresholds
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(i.e., the proportion or number of others that make their decision before a given agent)
on the collective behavior, discusses an equilibrium in a process occurring over time and
the stability of equilibrium outcomes.
A certain model of influence is studied in Asavathiratham (2000); see also Asavathi-
ratham et al. (2001) and Koster et al. (2010) for related works. The model consists of a
network of nodes, each with a status evolving over time. The evolution of the status is
according to an internal Markov chain, but transition probabilities depend not only on
the current status of the node, but also on the statuses of the neighboring nodes.
Another work on interaction is presented in Hu and Shapley (2003b,a), where authors
apply the command structure of Shapley (1994) to model players’ interaction relations
by simple games. For each player, boss sets and approval sets are introduced, and based
on these sets, a simple game called the command game for a player is built. In Hu and
Shapley (2003a) the authors introduce an authority distribution over an organization
and the (stochastic) power transition matrix, in which an entry in row j and column
k is interpreted as agent j’s “power” transfered to k. The authority equilibrium equa-
tion is defined. In Hu and Shapley (2003a) multi-step commands are considered, where
commands can be implemented through command channels.
There is also a numerous literature on social learning, in particular, in the context
of social networks; see e.g. Banerjee (1992), Ellison (1993), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993,
1995), Bala and Goyal (1998, 2001), Gale and Kariv (2003), Celen and Kariv (2004),
Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004). In general, in social learning models agents observe
choices over time and update their beliefs accordingly, which is different from the model
analyzed in our paper, where the choices depend on the influence of others.
1.2 The present paper
The present paper deals with a framework of influence introduced in Hoede and Bakker
(1982) and studied extensively, e.g., in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009, 2010a,b,c). We
consider a social network in which agents (players) may influence each others when mak-
ing decisions. Each agent has an inclination to choose one of the actions, but due to
influence by others, the decision of the agent may be different from his original inclina-
tion. Such a transformation from the agents’ inclinations to their decisions is represented
by an influence function. The functions considered so far in our works were deterministic.
Moreover, the framework analyzed in the related papers was a decision process after a
single step of mutual influence. However, in many real decision processes, the mutual
influence does not stop necessarily after one step but may iterate.
The aim of this paper is therefore to refine the model of influence in question and to
investigate its generalization in which the influence between players iterates. Any classical
influence function can be coded by a stochastic matrix, and an obvious generalization
leads to stochastic influence functions. We apply Markov chain theory to the analysis of
stochastic binary influence functions. Apart from a general analysis of the convergence, we
also study the convergence of particular influence functions whose deterministic versions
are introduced in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a) (majority influence function, guru
function, mass psychology function). Moreover, the Confucian example, analyzed, e.g., in
Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009, 2010b) as a one-step influence model, is reconsidered in
the dynamic framework.
3
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Despite the existence of numerous works on influence, our dynamic model is different
from the ones mentioned in Section 1.1. In particular, in our model rows and columns of
a stochastic matrix do not correspond to agents, but to a set of ‘yes’-agents. Hence, we
consider as a first achievement of our paper the proposition of such a general framework,
together with a precise analysis of convergence.
In the second part of the paper, we describe briefly the model of influence introduced
in Asavathiratham (2000), where influence is in some sense linear, and show that it can
be put into our framework of influence. Moreover, a generalization of this idea gives rise
to the wide class of models based on aggregation functions: roughly speaking, the opinion
of each agent is obtained as an aggregation (not necessarily linear) of the opinion of the
others. It turns out that all examples given in the paper are particular cases of this model.
We give a complete description of terminal states and classes in this framework, and give
a simple sufficient condition for which the only terminal states are the consensus states.
This is the second (and main) achievement of the paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly present selected
basic concepts on directed graphs and Markov chains. Section 3 concerns the point of
departure for this research, that is, our one-step model of influence. In Section 4 we
investigate the dynamic process of influence in the framework. In Sections 5 and 6 the
convergence of several influence functions is studied. In Section 7 we compare our dynamic
influence model with the model of influence introduced by Asavathiratham (2000). Section
8 concerns models based on aggregation functions. Section 9 contains some concluding
remarks.
2 Basic notions on directed graphs and Markov chains
In this section we summarize the basic material on Markov chains needed for our purpose.
We refer the reader to standard textbooks, e.g., Seneta (1973), Horn and Johnson (1985),
Meyer (2000)) for more details.
We denote vectors by lower-case boldface letters and matrices by upper-case boldface
letters, with entries in the corresponding lower case letters. 1 and 0 denote all-ones and
all-zeros column vectors of length n, respectively.
Let X = {x1, . . . , xm} be a finite set of states. We consider the m × m transition
matrix P = [pij ]i,j=1,...,m, where pij is the probability that the next state s(t + 1) is xj
knowing that the current state s(t) is xi, i.e., pij = Prob(s(t + 1) = xj | s(t) = xi).
This matrix is row-stochastic. Let us consider now the row-vector z(t) := [zi]i=1,...,m of
probabilities of each state at time t, i.e., zi := Prob(s(t) = xi). We know from Markov
chain theory that
z(t) = z(t− 1)P = · · · = z(0)Pt. (1)
To P we associate its transition directed graph (digraph) Γ , whose set of nodes is the set
of states X, and there is a directed edge from xi to xj if and only if pij > 0 (then we say
that xj is a successor of xi). A path in Γ is a sequence of nodes xj1 , . . . , xjk such that xjl+1
is a successor of xjl for l = 1, . . . , k−1. A cycle is a path for which the first and last nodes
coincide, and its length is the number of edges. A (strongly) connected component (called
more simply a class) is any subset S of nodes such that there is a path from any node to
any other node of S, and which is maximal for this property (note that a single node can
4
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be a class). If the graph has only one class (which is then X), then the matrix is said to
be irreducible. A class is transient if there is an edge going outside it, otherwise the class
is said to be recurrent or terminal. The set of all classes C1, . . . , Ck forms a partition of
X. A terminal class C is said to be periodic of period p if the greatest common divisor of
the length of all cycles in C is p. If p = 1, we say that the class is aperiodic. When the
matrix is irreducible, if its (unique) class is aperiodic, we say that the matrix is aperiodic
too. Usually, aperiodic (and therefore irreducible) matrices are called ergodic.
We turn to the study of convergence. We say that P is convergent if limt→∞ zP
t exists
for all vectors z (equivalently, if for any initial vectors z(0), the limit limt→∞ z(t) exists.
The following situations can happen:
(i) If there is a single aperiodic terminal class (obviously, this is the case for ergodic matri-
ces), the process terminates in this class, and the probability vector z∞ := limt→∞ z(t)
of the states in this class is given by solving the eigenvector equation z∞ = z∞P˜, where
P˜ is the submatrix of P corresponding to the states in the terminal class.
(ii) If the terminal class is periodic of period p, limt→∞ z(t) does not exist. The terminal
class C can be partitioned into p subclasses C1, . . . , Cp, so that if at time t the system
is in a state in Ck, then at time t+1 it will be in a state in Ck+1. However, its Cesaro
limit limt→∞
1
t
(z(1) + z(2) + · · ·+ z(t)) exists, and is found as above.
(iii) If there are several terminal classes, the process terminates in one of them with some
probability which can be computed as follows. First we replace each terminal class
by a single terminal state. Then we order the states such that states x1, . . . , xk of
transient classes are listed first, and then come the terminal states xk+1, . . . , xm. Then
the matrix P takes the following form:
P =
[
QR
0 I
]
where the k × k submatrix Q gives the probabilities of transition among transient
states, the k × (m − k) matrix R gives the probabilities of transition from transient
states to terminal classes, and I is the identity matrix of size m− k. Let us denote by
Π the k × (m− k) matrix giving the probabilities of reaching one of terminal states
from one of the transient states. Then one can prove that
Π = (I−Q)−1R, (2)
where I is now the identity matrix of size k.
3 The one-step model of influence
We consider a social network with the set of agents (players) denoted by N := {1, ..., n}.
Each player j ∈ N has to make a certain acceptance-rejection decision, and he has an
inclination (original opinion) ij to say either ‘yes’ (denoted by +1) or ‘no’ (denoted by
−1). An inclination vector denoted by i is an n-vector consisting of ones and minus ones
and indicating inclinations of the agents. Let I := {−1,+1}n be the set of all inclination
vectors.
It is assumed that agents may influence each others, and due to the influences in the
network, the final decision of an agent may be different from his original inclination. In
5
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other words, each inclination vector i ∈ I is transformed into a decision vector (final
opinion after influence) B(i), where B : I → I, i 7→ B(i), is the influence function. The
decision vector B(i) is an n-vector consisting of ones and minus ones and indicating the
decisions made by all agents. The coordinates of B(i) are denoted by (B(i))j , j ∈ N .
For convenience, (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ I is denoted by 1N , and (−1,−1, . . . ,−1) ∈ I by −1N .
In the paper, we use frequently the equivalent set notation, i.e., by S ⊆ N we denote
the set of agents with the inclination to say ‘yes’. Similarly, if i corresponds to S, we
denote B(i) by B(S), and B(S) ⊆ N is the set of agents whose decision is ‘yes’. Hence,
an influence function can also be seen as a mapping from 2N to 2N .
Consequently, any classical influence function B can be coded by a 2n × 2n row-
stochastic matrix B = [bS,T ]S,T⊆N with entries
bS,T :=
{
1, if B(S) = T
0, otherwise
.
In other words, for a set S of the yes-inclined agents, if after one step of influence repre-
sented by the matrix B all agents who decide ‘yes’ are the ones in a certain set T , then
the entry of matrix B in row S and column T is 1, and the entry in row S and any column
different from T is 0.
Remark 1 In order to write the matrix, one needs to define an order on the subsets
of N . We propose the binary order, which has the advantage to be recursively defined.
Example for n = 4[[
[[[∅], 1], 2, 12], 3, 13, 23, 123
]
, 4, 14, 24, 124, 34, 134, 234, 1234
]
.
An obvious generalization is to define bS,T as the probability that B(S) is T , which
gives a stochastic influence function. In other words, any stochastic influence function B
can be coded by a 2n × 2n row-stochastic matrix B = [bS,T ]S,T⊆N with
bS,T := Prob(B(S) = T )
and
∑
T⊆N bS,T = 1 for every S ⊆ N .
4 The dynamic process of influence
Next, we consider iteration of the model of influence recapitulated in Section 3: we sup-
pose that the processus of influence does not stop after one step (e.g., there are several
rounds in the discussion). Let us denote by S(0) the set of players with inclination ‘yes’.
After influence, the set of ‘yes’ players becomes S(1) = B(S(0)), and let us denote by
S(2), . . . , S(k), . . . the sequence of sets of ‘yes’ players after successive steps of influence.
We make the following fundamental assumption: S(k) depends only on S(k − 1) and
not on the whole history S(0), . . . , S(k− 1). Moreover, the influence mechanism does not
change with time. As a consequence, S(2) = B(S(1)) = B(B(S(0))) =: B(2)(S(0)), and
more generally S(t) = B(t)(S(0)).
Switching to the matrix representation of an influence function, we see that S(k)
obeys a Markov chain whose set of states is 2N (set of ‘yes’ voters), and B becomes the
6
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transition matrix of the Markov chain.1 Each state S, i.e., vertex of the digraph Γ (B)
of the transition matrix, corresponds in our model to the set of ‘yes’ agents, and arrows
from state S to state T denote a possible transition (with positive probability) from S to
T .
Let x(t) denote the probability distribution over the states at time t ∈ N, i.e., x(t)
is a 2n-dim row vector satisfying x1 = 1. The Markovian assumption implies by (1) that
x(t) evolves as follows:
x(t) = x(t− 1)B = x(t− 2)B2 = · · · = x(0)Bt,
where x(0) is the initial probability distribution.
Applying directly results from Section 2, we can describe the convergence of the pro-
cess of influence. We summarize below the various situations, and give first a qualitative
description, which can be easily obtained from the transition graph Γ (B), and a quanti-
tative description obtained from the transition matrix B.
Description of the convergence conditions from the graph (qualitative):
First, we compute all strongly connected components of the graph (classes), and distin-
guish between transient and terminal classes. Second, we check if terminal classes are
periodic or aperiodic.
– If there is a single aperiodic terminal class, the process will converge in this class. If
the class is reduced to a single state, it means that the process will end up in this
state with probability 1. Otherwise, there is a limit vector of probabilities to be in the
states of this class.
– If there are several terminal aperiodic classes, the process will converge into one of
these classes with some probability depending on the initial state.
– If one of the terminal classes is periodic, there is no convergence, and the process will
loop into this class.
Description of the convergence conditions from the matrix (quantitative):
– There is always an eigenvalue of modulus 1 for B. If 1 is an eigenvalue, its multiplicity
indicates the number of aperiodic terminal classes.
– If the d-root of 1 is an eigenvalue, there is a periodic terminal class of period d.
– Assume there is a single terminal class, which is aperiodic (i.e., 1 is a single eigenvalue,
and no other eigenvalue has modulus 1). Then the asymptotic probability distribution
over states is the vector x := limt→∞ x(t) which is a solution of
xB = x
satisfying x1 = 1. It is independent of the initial probability distribution x(0).
– Assume there is a single periodic terminal class. Then there is no asymptotic proba-
bility distribution over states, but the Cesaro limit z := limt→∞ z(t), with
z(t) =
1
t
(
x(0) + x(1) + · · ·+ x(t)
)
exists and z is a solution of zB = z with z1 = 1.
1 In principle, this is also possible for the discrete case: assuming m actions for each player would lead to a
mn ×mn matrix. Nevertheless, in this paper we focus on the binary case.
7
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5 Convergence of selected influence functions
We start with a very simple 2-agent example, and then we iterate several influence func-
tions whose deterministic versions have been introduced originally in the binary one-step
model of influence; see Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009, 2010b,a).
5.1 Following or being independent?
Let us consider a married couple: husband (agent 1) and wife (agent 2) who have to make
regularly their decisions on a certain household issue. They can form different kinds of
networks that lead to different decision-making processes. One possibility for each of them
is just to remain independent and to follow his or her own inclination, no matter what
the inclination of the other side is. Another extreme possibility for making a decision is to
follow always the inclination of the other side. In the first case, the decisions are modeled
by the identity function Id, and in the second case by the follow function Fol, that are
given by
Id(i) = i, Fol(i1, i2) = (i2, i1) for any i = (i1, i2) ∈ I.
The transition matrices are therefore
Id =
∅ 1 2 12
∅
1
2
12

1 1 2 12
1
1
1
 Fol =
∅ 1 2 12
∅
1
2
12

1 1 2 12
1
1
1

where each “blank” entry means zero. The corresponding graphs are given in Figure 1.
∅ 1
2 12
∅ 1
2 12
Fig. 1. The graphs of the identity function Id (left) and the follow function Fol (right) for n = 2
For the identity case there are four terminal classes (∅, 1, 2, and 12), so if both husband
and wife are always independent, the convergence occurs immediately. On the other hand,
if the couple tries to be “ideal” and each of the two always follows the another one, the
graph has a periodic class: the follow function is not convergent.
Another possibility for the couple would be to form a network in which one of them
is a guru. Such a function for an arbitrary number of agents is presented in the next
subsection.
5.2 The guru function
It might happen that there is a special influential agent which is followed by everybody.
8
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Definition 1 Let k˜ ∈ N be a particular agent called the guru. The guru influence func-
tion Gur[
ek] is defined by, using set notation
Gur[
ek](S) :=
{
N, if k˜ ∈ S
∅, if k˜ /∈ S
, ∀S ⊆ N.
For instance, the matrix of the guru function for n = 3 and k˜ = 1 is
Gur[1] =
∅ 1 2 12 3 13 23 123
∅
1
2
12
3
13
23
123

1 1 2 12 3 13 23 123
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

where each “blank” entry means zero, and its associated graph is given in Figure 2.
∅
1 2 3
12 13 23
123
Fig. 2. The graph of the guru function Gur[1] for n = 3
Hence, ∅ and 123 are terminal classes. In what follows, a state at time t will be denoted
by S(t). For the guru function in the general case, we have the following:
Fact 1 Let Gur[
ek] be the guru function as given in Definition 1. If the initial state S(0)
contains the guru, then S(1) = N = S(t) for each t ∈ N. Otherwise, the process converges
to ∅, and the convergence occurs at t = 1.
5.3 The majority influence function
One of the natural ways of making a decision in the influence environment is to decide
according to an inclination of a majority. In other words, if the majority of agents has
the inclination +1, then all agents decide +1, and if not, then all agents decide −1.
9
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Definition 2 Let n ≥ η > ⌊n
2
⌋. The majority influence function Maj[η] is defined by
Maj[η](S) :=
{
N, if |S| ≥ η
∅, if |S| < η
, ∀S ⊆ N
where |S| denotes the cardinality of S.
For instance, the majority function written as a matrix for n = 3 and η = 2 is given by
Maj[2] =
∅ 1 2 12 3 13 23 123
∅
1
2
12
3
13
23
123

1 1 2 12 3 13 23 123
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

The associated graph of such a majority influence function is presented in Figure 3.
∅
1 2 3
12 13 23
123
Fig. 3. The graph of the majority function Maj[2] for n = 3
Obviously, ∅ and 123 are terminal classes. Moreover, for the majority function in the
general case, we have the following:
Fact 2 Let Maj[η] be the majority influence function as given in Definition 2. If the initial
state S(0) is such that |S(0)| < η, then the process converges to ∅ with probability 1.
Otherwise, it converges to N with probability 1. The convergence already occurs at t = 1.
5.4 The stochastic mass psychology function
According to a mass psychology function, if there is a sufficiently high number of agents
with inclination x ∈ {+1,−1}, then it will possibly influence agents with a (−x) incli-
nation, and some of them will decide x, while the others will not change. The majority
function Maj[η] is of this type with x = +1.
10
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Definition 3 Let n ≥ η > ⌊n
2
⌋, x ∈ {+1,−1}, and ix := {k ∈ N : ik = x} for any i ∈ I.
The mass psychology function Mass[η] satisfies
if |ix| ≥ η, then (Mass[η](i))x ⊇ ix.
In particular, we can define the stochastic mass psychology function, where a subset of
(−x)-inclined agents will decide x with a certain probability. For instance, the stochastic
mass psychology function (with uniform distribution) (n = 3, η = 2) is given by the
following matrix:
Mass[2] =
∅.5 1.5 2.5 12 3.5 13 23 123
∅
1
2
12
3
13
23
123

1 1 2 12 3 13 23 123
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
1

where again a “blank” entry means zero. The associated graph is given in Figure 4.
∅
1 2 3
12 13 23
123
Fig. 4. The graph of the stochastic mass psychology function Mass[2] for n = 3
Similarly, ∅ and 123 are terminal classes. For the stochastic mass psychology function
in the general case, with n > 3 and η > ⌊n
2
⌋, we have the following:
Fact 3 Let Mass[η] be the mass psychology function with n > 3 and η > ⌊n
2
⌋. If the initial
state S(0) satisfies |S(0)| ≥ η, then it converges to N with probability 1 (under some
mild conditions on the transition matrix). If |S(0)| ≤ n − η, then it converges to ∅ with
probability 1. In all other cases, nothing can be said in general.
11
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6 The Confucian model
Let us consider the Confucian model of society; see Hu and Shapley (2003a) and Grabisch
and Rusinowska (2009, 2010b). We analyze a small four-member society N = {1, 2, 3, 4},
which consists of the king = agent 1, the man = agent 2, the wife = agent 3, and the
child = agent 4. The principles in the decision-making process of the society say that:
(i) The man follows the king;
(ii) The wife and the child follow the man;
(iii) The king should respect his people.
The principles (i) and (ii) give the following conditions for the Confucian influence func-
tion Conf.
Definition 4 The Confucian influence function Conf satisfies
(Conf(i))2 = i1, (Conf(i))3 = (Conf(i))4 = i2 for all i ∈ I
or, in the set notation, for every S ⊆ N
1 ∈ S ⇒ 2 ∈ Conf(S), 2 ∈ S ⇒ 3, 4 ∈ Conf(S).
Depending on the interpretation of the rule (iii), we consider several versions of the
model that lead to different definitions of the king’s decision.
(1) 1st version: the king needs (for the YES decision) approval of all his people, including
himself. Hence, the king’s decision satisfies
(Conf(1N))1 = +1 and (Conf(i))1 = −1 for every i 6= 1N . (3)
The graph of this version of the Confucian function is given in Figure 5.
∅ 12
3
4
12
1323 123
1424 124
34 134234 1234
Fig. 5. The graph of the Confucian function Conf - 1st version
Every node is a connected component. They are all transient classes, except N and ∅
which are terminal. We have the following:
12
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Fact 4 Let Conf be the first version of the Confucian function as given by Definition
4 and equation (3). If the initial state is N , then S(0) = N = S(t) for each t ∈ N,
and if S(0) is different from N , then the process converges to ∅ in at most 3 steps.
(2) 2nd version: the king needs (for the YES decision) a majority of his people (≥ 2).
Additionally, his inclination must be also positive. The king’s decision is then:
(Conf(i))1 = +1 iff (i1 = +1 and |{k ∈ N \ 1 : ik = +1}| ≥ 2) . (4)
The graph is given in Figure 6.
∅ 12
3
4
12
1323 123
1424 124
34 134234 1234
Fig. 6. The graph of the Confucian function Conf - 2nd version
We have then the following:
Fact 5 Let Conf be the second version of the Confucian function as given by Defini-
tion 4 and equation (4). If the initial state is either 123, 124 or N , then the process
terminates at N , otherwise the process converges to ∅ in at most 4 steps.
(3) 3rd version: the king needs the approval of only one of his people, and his inclination
must be positive. Hence, we get
(Conf(i))1 = +1 iff (i1 = +1 and |{k ∈ N \ 1 : ik = +1}| ≥ 1) . (5)
The graph for this version is presented in Figure 7.
Similarly as in the previous cases, we get immediately the following:
Fact 6 Let Conf be the third version of the Confucian function as given by Definition
4 and equation (5). If the initial state is 1 or it does not contain the king, then the
process converges to ∅ in at most 3 steps. Otherwise, i.e., if the initial state contains
the king (except the initial state 1), then the process converges to N in at most 2 steps.
(4) Stochastic case: the king’s decision is as follows:
13
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∅ 12
3
4
12
1323 123
1424 124
34 134234 1234
Fig. 7. The graph of the Confucian function Conf - 3rd version
– for the YES inclination, the king has a uniform distribution on all 3 previous cases;
– for the NO inclination, the king changes to YES if there is unanimity of his people
(1/3), if there is a majority of his people (1/3) or he does not change (1/3).
Figure 8 presents the graph of this stochastic Confucian function. If the transition
from S to T has a probability less than 1, we figure the value of this probability on
the edge from S to T .
∅ 12
3
4
12
1323 123
1424 124
34 134234 1234
1
3
2
3
2
3
1
3 2
3
1
3
2
3
1
32
3
1
3
2
3
1
3
2
3
1
3
1
3
2
3
2
3
1
3
2
3
1
3
Fig. 8. The graph of the stochastic Confucian function Conf - 4th version
As before, the two terminal classes are ∅ and N (consensus situations). The transient
classes are 3, 4, 23, 24, {1, 2, 34}, 13, 14, 123, 124, and {12, 134, 234}. The reduced
graph is given in Figure 9.
14
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24
23
14
13
12, 134, 234
1, 2, 34
3
4
123
124
∅
1234
Fig. 9. The reduced graph of the stochastic Confucian function Conf
Let us compute the probability of reaching the terminal classes starting from any
transient state, using (2). Since we have only two terminal classes, it is enough to
compute the probability of reaching, say ∅ from any state S, which we denote by piS .
Then the column vector π := [piS]S∈2N\{N,∅} is solution of the system
(I−Q)π = r
where I is the (2n − 2)-size identity matrix, Q is the transition matrix for the 2n − 2
transient states (see coefficients on Fig. 8), and r := [rS]S∈2N\{N,∅} gives the transition
probabilities from transient states to terminal states
r3 = 1, r4 = 1, r34 =
2
3
, rS = 0 otherwise.
In summary,
pi3 = 1
pi4 = 1
pi13 −
2
3
pi2 −
1
3
pi12 = 0
pi14 −
2
3
pi2 −
1
3
pi12 = 0
pi23 −
2
3
pi34 −
1
3
pi134 = 0
pi24 −
2
3
pi34 −
1
3
pi134 = 0
pi123 −
1
3
pi234 = 0
pi124 −
1
3
pi234 = 0
pi1 − pi2 = 0
pi2 − pi34 = 0
pi34 −
1
3
pi2 =
2
3
pi12 −
2
3
pi234 = 0
pi134 −
1
3
pi2 −
2
3
pi12 = 0
pi234 −
1
3
pi34 −
2
3
pi134 = 0
By solving this system, we get the following:
15
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Fact 7 Let Conf be the stochastic version of the Confucian function as defined above,
at point (4). There are two terminal classes ∅ and N . Let piS denote the probability of
reaching ∅ from transient state S. Then:
pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = pi4 = pi34 = 1
pi12 =
10
19
, pi13 = pi14 =
16
19
, pi23 = pi24 =
17
19
pi123 = pi124 =
5
19
, pi134 =
13
19
, pi234 =
15
19
.
7 Comparison with the Asavathiratham model
We describe briefly the model proposed by Asavathiratham. There is a set N of n agents
who must make a yes/no decision. There is an n×n row-stochastic matrix D := [dij]i,j∈N ,
called the network influence matrix, whose term dij expresses the weight of player j in the
opinion of i. Specifically, let s(t) be an n-dim column vector which is 0-1 valued: si(t) = 1
(resp., 0) indicates that player i says ‘yes’ (resp., ‘no’) at time t. Then at time t+ 1, the
probability xi(t + 1) that player i says ‘yes’, for all i ∈ N , is given by
x(t+ 1) = Ds(t).
Next, from x(t + 1), one computes s(t + 1) ∈ {0, 1}n, obtained as a random realization
of n independent Bernoulli random variables with probability x1(t), . . . , xn(t).
Note that x(t) is not a probability vector. The model is similar to DeGroot’s model,
D has the same meaning, however x(t) has a different meaning since in DeGroot’s model,
xi(t) is the opinion of player i, which is a real number in some interval.
Asavathiratham studies the convergence of his model, and among others rediscovers
DeGroot’s results. In particular, x(t) converges towards a consensus vector, i.e., each
player has the same positive probability to say ‘yes’. ¿From this, it is proved that only two
situations can occur: either all players say ‘yes’, or all players say ‘no’ (in our terminology,
there are two terminal states, N and ∅).
This model has the advantage of simplicity: the influence is linear, and D is much
smaller than our matrix B. We will show that we can cast it into our framework, but
this will put into light some difficulties to interpret the Asavathiratham model from a
probabilistic point of view.
Let us first construct the matrix B. Suppose that at time t, players in the set S ⊆ N
say ‘yes’, and the others say ‘no’. Hence s(t) = 1S, where 1S is the column vector with
components 1 for i ∈ S and 0 otherwise. Computing x(t+1) = Ds(t) gives the probability
of each player to say ‘yes’ after one step of influence. Supposing the decision of players
to be independent as it is supposed in the Asavathiratham model, it is then possible to
compute the probability for every T ⊆ N to be the set of ‘yes’ players at time t+1 (this
is vector s(t + 1)), that is, in our terminology, the probability of each state. This gives
the row [bS,T ]T⊆N of our matrix B. Formally:
bS,T =
∏
i∈T
xi(t + 1)
∏
i6∈T
(1− xi(t + 1))
=
∏
i∈T
dS,i
∏
i6∈T
(1− dS,i), ∀T ⊆ N (6)
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with dS,i :=
∑
j∈S dij, or more compactly dS = D1S. Taking all S ⊆ N determines the
matrix B entirely.
The next proposition shows that the two models are equivalent.
Proposition 1 Assume D is given, and consider B constructed by (6). For any s(t) =
1S, the output x(t+1) = Ds(t) can be recovered from z(t+1) = z(t)B with z(t) = δS by
xi(t+ 1) =
∑
S∋i
zS(t+ 1) (7)
where δS is the 2
n-dimensional row vector having all its components equal to 0, except
the one corresponding to S, which is 1.
Proof: ¿From x(t + 1) = Ds(t) we have xi(t + 1) = dS,i. On the other hand, from
z(t+ 1) = δSB we have zT (t+ 1) = bS,T . Therefore,∑
T∋i
zT (t+ 1) =
∑
T∋i
bS,T =
∑
T∋i
(∏
j∈T
dS,j
∏
j 6∈T
(1− dS,j)
)
= dS,i
( ∑
T⊆N\i
(∏
j∈T
dS,j
∏
j 6∈T
(1− dS,j)
))
= dS,i.
The last equality follows from the fact that for any p and real numbers x1, . . . , xp
1 =
p∏
i=1
((1− xi) + xi) =
∑
S⊆{1,...,p}
(∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i6∈S
(1− xi)
)
.

Remark 2 The above result extends to the case where s(t) ∈ [0, 1]n by linearity of D
and B. Indeed, any vector x ∈ [0, 1]n can be decomposed into vectors 1S:
x =
∑
S⊆N
1S
(∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i6∈S
(1− xi)
)
,
since for every j ∈ N , the jth component of the right-hand side is∑
S∋j
(∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i6∈S
(1− xi)
)
= xj
( ∑
S⊆N\j
(∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i6∈S
(1− xi)
))
= xj
proceeding as above. For z(t) ∈ [0, 1]2
n
, the decomposition is trivial:
z(t) =
∑
S⊆N
zS(t)δS.
17
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Remark 3 Although the formalism of the Asavathiratham model is simpler than ours, it
is in fact more difficult to use. Once our matrix B is computed, we can compute directly
z(t) from z(0) by z(0)Bt and study convergence. However, computing x(2) = Dx(1) =
D2s(0) with s(0) = 1S does not permit to compute directly the probability that T is the
coalition of ‘yes’ voters by
Prob(T ) =
∏
i∈T
xi(2)
∏
i6∈T
(1− xi(2)) (8)
because one cannot see why the individual probabilities should still be independent at
t = 2, taken for granted that they are at t = 1. In fact, the model is not clear from a
probabilistic point of view because there is no clear meaning for “combining values which
are considered as probabilities of individual to say yes”. A proper probabilistic setting
should consider combination of random variables, but it does not seem that this model
can be interpreted as a linear combination of n random variables, one for each player.
Anyway, linear combinations of independent random variables are no more independent
in general.
The next example illustrates the above proposition and remarks.
Example 1 Let us consider a simplified Confucian model with only 3 players: the king
(1), the man (2) and the wife (3). As before the man follows the king, the wife follows the
man, and the king respects his people. This last rule is implemented as follows: the king
takes the average probability to say ‘yes’, including himself. Hence, the model is easily
put into the Asavathiratham framework: the matrix is simply
D =
13 13 131 0 0
0 1 0

Let us compute the matrix B:
s(t) =
[
1 0 0
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
1
3
1 0
]T
→ b1,12 =
1
3
, b1,2 =
2
3
s(t) =
[
0 1 0
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
1
3
0 1
]T
→ b2,13 =
1
3
, b2,3 =
2
3
s(t) =
[
0 0 1
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
1
3
0 0
]T
→ b3,1 =
1
3
, b3,∅ =
2
3
s(t) =
[
1 1 0
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
2
3
1 1
]T
→ b12,123 =
2
3
, b12,23 =
1
3
s(t) =
[
1 0 1
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
2
3
1 0
]T
→ b13,12 =
2
3
, b13,2 =
1
3
s(t) =
[
0 1 1
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
2
3
0 1
]T
→ b23,13 =
2
3
, b23,3 =
1
3
18
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and b∅,∅ = 1, b123,123 = 1. Hence, the matrix is:
B =
∅00 100 200 120 300 130 230 123
∅
1
2
12
3
13
23
123

100 00 00 00 123
2/3 1/3
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
1/3 2/3
1

Consider now s(0) =
[
1 0 0
]T
. Then x(1) =
[
1
3
1 0
]T
and x(2) =
[
4
9
1
3
1
]T
. From B we
have with z(0) = δ{1}:
z12(1) =
1
3
, z2(1) =
2
3
z3(2) =
4
9
, z13(2) =
2
9
, z23(2) =
1
9
, z123(2) =
2
9
.
However, a computation of z(2) from x(2) by (8) gives:
z3(t+ 1) =
10
27
, z13(t+ 1) =
8
27
, z23(t+ 1) =
5
27
, z123(t + 1) =
4
27
.
Observe that the computation of probabilities of states from x(2) is not correct. A correct
computation should proceeds as follows: since from x(1) we know that states 12 and 2
can happen with probabilities 1/3 and 2/3 respectively, we compute x(12)(2) := D[1 1 0]T
and x(2)(2) := D[0 1 0]T :
x(12)(2) =
[
2
3
1 1
]T
, x(2)(2) =
[
1
3
0 1
]T
.
¿From x(12)(2), we deduce that states 123 and 23 happen with probability 2/3 and 1/3
respectively, while from x(2)(2) we deduce that states 13 and 3 happen with probability
1/3 and 2/3 respectively. Multiplying by the a priori probabilities gives the desired result.
One can also verify that x(1) can be recovered from z(1) by (7), and this remains true
for x(2) and z(2) (Remark 2).
8 Models based on aggregation functions
The Asavathiratham model performs a convex combination of individual probabilities.
This is a particular example of aggregation, but other ways of aggregating can be thought
of.
Example 2 Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and the following way to aggregate probabilities:
– Agent 1 takes the minimum of all agents
– Agent 2 takes the maximum of agents 1 and 3
– Agent 3 takes the minimum of agents 1 and 2.
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Despite the nonlinear character of this aggregation procedure, one can still apply our
methodology. The matrix B can be obtained exactly as with the Asavathiratham model:
s(t) =
[
1 0 0
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
0 1 0
]T
→ b1,2 = 1
s(t) =
[
0 1 0
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
0 0 0
]T
→ b2,∅ = 1
s(t) =
[
0 0 1
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
0 1 0
]T
→ b3,2 = 1
s(t) =
[
1 1 0
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
0 1 1
]T
→ b12,23 = 1
s(t) =
[
1 0 1
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
0 1 0
]T
→ b13,2 = 2
s(t) =
[
0 1 1
]T
→ x(t + 1) =
[
0 1 1
]T
→ b23,2 = 1.
¿From this, z(t) can be computed from any z(0), and convergence can be studied as
described in Section 4.
More generally,
Definition 5 An n-place aggregation function is any mapping A : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] satis-
fying
(i) A(0, . . . , 0) = 0, A(1, . . . , 1) = 1 (boundary conditions)
(ii) If x ≤ x′ then A(x) ≤ A(x′) (nondecreasingness).
Aggregation functions are well-studied and there exist many families of them: all kinds
of means (geometric, harmonic, quasi-arithmetic) and their weighted version, weighted
ordered averages, any combination of minimum and maximum (lattice polynomials or
Sugeno integrals), Choquet integrals, triangular norms, copulas, etc. (see Grabisch et al.
(2009)).
To each player i ∈ N let us associate an aggregation function Ai. Then from s =
1S, we compute x = (A1(1S), . . . , An(1S)), where 1S := (1S)
T . Considering as in the
Asavathiratham model that x is a vector of independent probabilities of saying ‘yes’ for
each player, we find that
bS,T =
∏
i∈T
xi
∏
i6∈T
(1− xi), ∀S, T ⊆ N,
which determines B.
To show that the aggregation model is very general, we show below that all previous
examples can be casted into this framework.
Example 3 (The Confucian model revisited) The different versions of the Confu-
cian model (Section 6) fits well to an aggregation model. We have in any case for the
man, the wife and the child a projection:
A2(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1, A3(x1, x2, x3, x4) = A4(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x2.
For versions 1, 2 and 3, any aggregation function A1 satisfying respectively
(i) A1(1S) = 0 for all S 6= N (1st version (unanimity))
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(ii) A1(1S) = 1 for all S ⊆ N s.t. |S| > 2 and S ∋ 1, and A1(1S) = 0 otherwise (2nd
version (majority))
(iii) A1(1S) = 1 for all S ⊆ N s.t. |S| > 1 and S ∋ 1, and A1(1S) = 0 otherwise (3d
version)
is suitable. For the stochastic version, A1 must have the following values:
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14
A1(1S) 0 0 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3
S 23 24 34 123 124 134 234
A1(1S) 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3
Example 4 (The other examples revisited) It is easy to see that the identity, fol-
low, guru and majority functions are particular cases of the aggregation model. This is
also true to a large extent for the stochastic mass psychology function. For this, one has
to specify for each S ⊆ N the probabilities of transition. If the set S of ‘yes’ players sat-
isfies |S| > η, then there is some probability that players in N \ S (‘no’ players) become
‘yes’ players (and similarly if S is the set of ‘no’ players). Suppose that for each situation
(S ⊆ N , ε =‘yes’ or ‘no’), the probability pS,εi that player i ∈ N \ S changes his opinion
is specified, and that players in N \ S change independently their opinion. Then this is
equivalent to an aggregation model defined as follows, for every S ⊆ N
Ai(1S) =

1, if i ∈ S and |S| ≥ η
pS,yesi , if i ∈ N \ S and |S| ≥ η
0, if i ∈ N \ S and |N \ S| ≥ η
p
N\S,no
i , if i ∈ S and |N \ S| ≥ η.
For example, the matrix given in Section 5.4 can be recovered as follows:
A1(1 0 0) = 0.5, A2(1 0 0) = 0, A3(1 0 0) = 0
A1(0 1 0) = 0, A2(0 1 0) = 0.5, A3(0 1 0) = 0
A1(0 0 1) = 0, A2(0 0 1) = 0, A3(0 0 1) = 0.5
A1(1 1 0) = 1, A2(1 1 0) = 1, A3(1 1 0) = 0.5
A1(1 0 1) = 1, A2(1 0 1) = 0.5, A3(1 0 1) = 1
A1(0 1 1) = 0.5, A2(0 1 1) = 1, A3(0 1 1) = 1.
Note that in our construction, we need to know the aggregation functions only for 0-1
vectors. One may wonder however how to choose a particular aggregation function whose
values are known only for 0-1 vectors. This can be seen as an interpolation problem. A
fundamental result in aggregation theory says that the most parsimonious (in number of
points involved to perform the interpolation) piecewise linear interpolation is given by
the Choquet integral (Grabisch et al., 2009, Ch. 5, Prop. 5.25).
We end this section by studying terminal states and classes. In almost all examples
seen so far, the two consensus states ∅ and N were the only terminal states. Obviously,
this is not true in general, and it is difficult to draw some conclusion in general. The
aggregation model permits however to be more conclusive. First we need the following
definition.
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Definition 6 (i) A player j is weakly essential for aggregation function A if A(1{j}) > 0
and A(1{ij}) > A(1{i}) for all i ∈ N, i 6= j.
(ii) A player j is essential for aggregation function A if for all S ⊆ N\j, A(1S∪j) > A(1S).
Note that for any strictly increasing aggregation function, all players are essential (and
therefore weakly essential), but the converse is false. For clarity, we begin by studying
terminal states.
Theorem 1 Suppose B is obtained from an aggregation model, with aggregation functions
A1, . . . , An. Then
(i) {∅} and {N} are always terminal classes.
(ii) Coalition S is a terminal state if and only if
Ai(1S) = 1 ∀i ∈ S and Ai(1S) = 0 otherwise.
(iii) There are no other terminal states than ∅ and N if there is some Ai for which all
players are weakly essential.
Proof: Recall that a class or a state is terminal if there is no outgoing arrow in it.
(i) Since Ai(1, . . . , 1) = 1 for every aggregation function, when s = 1N , we have
x = (A1(1N), . . . , An(1N)) = (1, . . . , 1). Therefore the next state is N with probability 1,
and there cannot be any outgoing arrow from N . This proves that N is a terminal state.
Now from the property Ai(0, . . . , 0) = 0, we deduce similarly that ∅ is a terminal state.
(ii) Take any S 6= N, ∅. It is a terminal state if and only if bS,S = 1 and consequently
bS,T = 0 for all T 6= S. This is equivalent to (A1(1S), . . . , An(1S)) = 1S, i.e., Ai(1S) = 1
if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise.
(iii) Suppose that all players are weakly essential in Ai, and consider some j 6= i. Then
Ai(1{j}) > 0, which by condition (ii) and nondecreasingness of Ai implies that no state S
such that i 6∈ S and j ∈ S can be a terminal state. Since any j 6= i is weakly essential in
Ai, it turns out that only {i} can be a terminal state. If {i} is a terminal state then we
must also have Ai(1{i}) = 1. But this would imply that any j 6= i is not weakly essential,
a contradiction. 
The converse of (iii) is false: if there are only ∅ and N as terminal states, it does not
imply that one of the aggregation functions is with all players being weakly essential:
take for example the guru influence function where Ai(x1, . . . , xn) = xek for i = 1, . . . , n.
Clearly, only the guru is weakly essential in Ai.
Note that the above theorem says nothing about terminal classes which are not re-
duced to singletons. For terminal classes in general, we have the following result.
Theorem 2 Suppose B is obtained from an aggregation model, with aggregation functions
A1, . . . , An. Then
(i) Terminal classes are:
– either cycles {S1, . . . , Sk} of any length 2 ≤ k ≤ 2
n − 2 (and therefore they are
periodic of period k) with the condition that there is no i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that
Si ⊆ Sj and Si+1 ⊇ Sj+1
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– or they can only contain 2k coalitions, for some k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. Each such
terminal class (except the case of a cycle of length 2) is a Boolean lattice [S, S ′]
with S ′ ⊇ S, |S ′ \ S| = k, i.e., the collection of all coalitions containing S and
contained in S ′, and there is at least one set connected to all others and itself.
(ii) If there exists Ai for which all players are weakly essential, then there are no other
terminal classes than {∅} and {N}, except possibly cyclic classes. If in addition all
players in Ai are essential, then there are no cyclic classes.
(see proof in the appendix)
9 Conclusions
We summarize the findings of the paper in several points:
– We consider the influence mechanism to be stochastic in nature, rather than deter-
ministic, as it was the case in our earlier works. Therefore, an influence function is
best represented as a row-stochastic matrix. Remarkable examples of such functions
are the mass psychology function and the Confucian model.
– Considering that influence may iterate, and making the assumption that the opinion
of the agents at time t depends only on the opinion of all agents at time t − 1, the
evolution of influence obeys a Markov chain, where states are coalitions of ‘yes’ players.
Therefore, the convergence of the process of influence is dictated by the classical results
on convergence of Markov chains. In particular, we can determine in which terminal
state or class the process will end. As far as we know, no such model has been proposed
in the literature before.
– Inspired by the linear model of influence proposed by Asavathiratham, which can be
casted into our framework, we propose a model of influence based on aggregation
functions. Here, the opinion of an agent is, roughly speaking, an aggregation (combi-
nation) of the opinion of the others. More precisely, the probability of agent i to say
‘yes’ uniquely depends on who said ‘yes’ and who said ‘no’ at previous step of dis-
cussion. Any kind of aggregation can be used, provided it preserves unanimity (if all
agents said ‘yes’ (resp., ‘no’), then agent i will say ‘yes’ (resp., ‘no’) with probability
1), and it is nondecreasing (the more agents said ‘yes’, the higher the probability).
Therefore, the model is very general, and all examples of influence function given in
the paper are particular cases of the aggregation model.
– For influence functions based on aggregation, we can give a complete description of
terminal states and classes: the two consensus states N and ∅ are always terminal
states. Other terminal classes are necessarily cycles of any length or classes of 2k
coalitions, for some k = 0, . . . , n − 1. If there is an aggregation function for which
all players are weakly essential, the only possible terminal classes are the consensus
states, or cycles. If in addition the players are essential, the process converges always
to one of the consensus states.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
(i) The proof of (i) goes in several steps.
1. We study the case of cycles. Consider S1, . . . , Sk with 2 ≤ k ≤ 2
n − 2. We must have:
(A1(1S1), . . . , An(1S1)) = 1S2
(A1(1S2), . . . , An(1S2)) = 1S3
... =
...
(A1(1Sk), . . . , An(1Sk)) = 1S1
Suppose that the vectors 1S1, . . . , 1Sk are incomparable (i.e., no relation of inclusion occurs
among the Si’s). Then no condition due to the nondecreasingness of the Ai’s applies, and
therefore there is no contradiction among the above equations. Now, suppose there exists
Si ⊆ Sj , and Si+1 ⊇ Sj+1. Then nondecreasingness implies (A1(1Si), . . . , An(1Si)) ≤
(A1(1Sj ), . . . , An(1Sj )), but 1Si+1 ≥ 1Sj+1 with some strict inequality, a contradiction. It
is not difficult to see that this is a necessary and sufficient condition.
2. We consider the case of classes formed of 2k sets. The case k = 0 is adressed in
Theorem 1. The case k > n− 1 cannot happen since ∅ and N are always terminal states.
2.1. Let us show that terminal classes can be formed of two coalitions (k = 1), say S and
T . The case of a cycle has been already studied. Consider then that there are loops on S
and/or T :
S T
First, we establish the following useful fact:
Claim 1: Suppose that from initial state S, there are only two possible transitions
to T and K (with possibly T or K = S). Then T∆K := (T \ K) ∪ (K \ T ) is a
singleton.
Proof of the claim: From initial state S, the next state can be only T or K. It
means that the vector of probability of individuals x = (A1(1S), . . . , An(1S)) must
contain only 1,0 and a single component x 6= 0, 1. Therefore, either T = K ∪ i or
T = K \ i for some i (the index of component x).
Applying Claim 1 to our situation, we find that T = S ∪ i or T = S \ i. Due to the
symmetry between S and T , we may assume without loss of generality that T = S ∪ i.
Therefore for initial state S, we have x = (1S, xi, 0N\(S∪i)), i.e.,
Aj(1S) = 1 if j ∈ S, Ai(1S) = x, Aj(1S) = 0 if j 6∈ S ∪ i,
and T and S realizes with probability x and 1− x respectively. Now, if the initial state
is T , by the same reasoning we deduce that
Aj(1S∪i) = 1 if j ∈ S, Ai(1S∪i) = x
′, Aj(1S∪i) = 0 if j 6∈ S ∪ i.
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Observe that the two conditions can be satisfied simultaneously, provided x′ ≥ x. Also,
we cannot have x = 0 or 1, nor x′ = 0 or 1, i.e., both loops must exist. Indeed, x = 0
(resp., x′ = 1) means that there is no transition from S to T (resp., from T to S), so
{S, T} does not form a class. So it remains only the possibility x = 1 and x′ = 0, which is
forbidden by the condition x′ ≥ x. In conclusion from Steps 1 and 2.1, the only possible
configurations of classes of two coalitions are those given in Fig. 10.
K ∪ S K ∪ T S S ∪ i
Fig. 10. Terminal class with 2 coalitions: periodic case (left; S, T 6= ∅), aperiodic case (right)
2.2. Let us study the case of a terminal class C formed with 3 coalitions S, T,K. For
any coalition in C, there is a possible transition to S, T and K. However, it is not
possible to have exactly 3 possible transitions: if the vector x = (A1(1S), . . . , An(1S)) has
only one component x different from 0,1, then exactly 2 transitions are possible, while 4
are possible when there are 2 components x, y different from 0,1. Hence, in our case, x
contains only one component x 6= 0, 1, and therefore from any coalition in C, only two
transitions among S, T,K are possible. Note that this amounts to consider the 4 following
situations, where 0, 1, 2 or 3 loops exist:
S T
K
S T
K
S T
K
S T
K
Let us examine the 1st configuration (no loop, periodic case). Applying Claim 1, we
deduce that T∆K = i, S∆K = j and S∆T = k. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that T = K ∪ i. Now, i 6= j. Indeed, if S = K ∪ j, i = j implies S = T . If
S = K \ j, since i 6∈ K and j ∈ K, we have i 6= j. Hence in any case S∆T = {i, j},
contradicting the fact that S∆T = k.
Let us examine the 2nd configuration (one loop). From Claim 1, we can only deduce
that S∆T = i and S∆K = j. Proceeding as above, one can check that i 6= j. There-
fore, the triple (S, T,K) can take the following forms: (S, S ∪ i, S ∪ j), (S, S ∪ i, S \ j),
(S, S \ i, S ∪ j) and (S, S \ i, S \ j). Taking the first form, we have:
s = 1S implies x = (A1(1S), . . . , An(1S)) = (0 · · ·0 1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
x︸︷︷︸
i
0 · · ·0)
s = 1S∪i implies x = (A1(1S∪i), . . . , An(1S∪i)) = (0 · · · 0 1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
0 x′︸︷︷︸
j
0 · · ·0).
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By nondecreasingness of Ai, we must have x = 0, but then there is no transition from S
to T and {S, T,K} is no more a class. For the second form, we have:
(A1(1S), . . . , An(1S)) = (0 · · ·0 1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S\j
1︸︷︷︸
j
x︸︷︷︸
i
0 · · ·0)
(A1(1S∪i), . . . , An(1S∪i)) = (0 · · ·0 1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S\j
0 x′︸︷︷︸
j
0 · · · 0).
Again, nondecreasingness of Aj implies that x
′ = 1, but then there is no transition from
T to K and {S, T,K} is no more a class. The two remaining cases are similar.
Let us examine the 3d configuration (2 loops). We see that from Claim 1, we can
deduce S∆T = i and T∆K = j. This is similar to the case of one loop. Finally, for the
configuration with 3 loops, we can deduce from Claim 1 that S∆T = i, T∆K = j and
K∆S = k, which is exactly the same situation as with Configuration 1 (without loops).
2.3. We turn to the general case. First, we generalize Claim 1 as follows:
Claim 2: Suppose that from initial state S, there are exactly 2k possible transitions
to S1, . . . , S2k (supposed all distinct but S may belong to the collection). Then
|Si∆Sj | ≤ k for any i, j = 1, . . . , 2
k, and moreover, the collection C := {S1, . . . , S2k}
necessarily forms a Boolean lattice, more precisely, considering w.l.o.g. that S1 is
the smallest set and S2k the greatest set, we have C = {S1 ∪K | K ⊆ S2k \ S1}.
Proof of the Claim: The 2k transitions can be obtained with a vector
x = (A1(1s), . . . , An(1S)) containing only 0,1 and k variables x1, . . . , xk in ]0, 1[.
The set of all “1” determines the smallest set S1, while the set of all “1” and
x1, . . . , xk determines the greatest one S2k . Clearly, all sets between S1 and S2k
can realize.
2.3.1. Suppose that the class C contains exactly 2k coalitions S1, . . . , S2k and that in C
there is a set Si having a transition to all sets in C, including Si itself (if not, we are in
the case treated in 2.3.2: there are more sets in the class than transitions on one set).
From Claim 2, it follows that C forms a Boolean lattice, say with least element S1 and
greatest element S2k . For all other sets Sj , j 6= i, we assume without loss of generality
that there are also 2k transitions, possibly with probability zero. We have the following
set of equations:
(A1(1S1), . . . , An(1S1)) = (0 · · ·0 1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
x11x
1
2 · · ·x
1
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
2k
\S1
)
(A1(1S2), . . . , An(1S2)) = (0 · · ·0 1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
x21x
2
2 · · ·x
2
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
2k
\S1
)
... =
...
(A1(1S
2k
), . . . , An(1S
2k
)) = (0 · · ·0 1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
x2
k
1 x
2k
2 · · ·x
2k
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
2k
\S1
)
Observe that this system has no contradiction as soon as the xli’s follow the inclusion
relations of the sets in C (for each i = 1, . . . , k, they must form the same Boolean lattice):
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Sj ⊆ Sl implies x
j
i ≤ x
l
i for all i = 1, . . . , k. Observe also that in general we may have
some of the xli equal to 0 or 1 (which correspond to suppression of some transitions)
provided that the monotoncity relations among them are preserved, and that C remains
strongly connected.
2.3.2. Suppose that the class contains more sets than the maximal number of transitions
on one set (this is the case if either the number of sets is not of the form 2k, or there are
2k sets but all sets have at most 2k
′
transitions with k′ < k).
Let us consider that the maximal number of transitions in the class is 2k, and Sj be
a set having this number of transitions. Let us call C the collection of 2k sets connected
to Sj. From Claim 2, it is a Boolean lattice of the form [S, S ∪ K], with |K| = k, and
S ⊆ Sj ⊆ S ∪K. Since by hypothesis the class contains more than 2
k sets, let us call by
T the collection of remaining sets. Since the class is strongly connected, there must be a
set Si ∈ C which is connected to some set in T , say T1.
Sj Si
S
S ∪K
T1
C T
We have by definition of Si and Sj :
(A1(1Sj ), . . . , An(1Sj)) = (0 · · · 0 1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
xj1 · · ·x
j
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
0 · · ·0)
(A1(1Si), . . . , An(1Si)) = (0 · · · 0 1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
xi1 · · · 0 · · ·x
i
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
0 · · · z · · · 0)
with xil, x
j
l > 0, l = 1, . . . , k, with z > 0 being at some position t, with t ∈ T1 \ (S ∪K),
and the zero in K (say, xil = 0) corresponding to some r ∈ K (there are as many such
t, r as the cardinality of T1 \ (S ∪K)).
Suppose that Si ⊆ Sj. Then by nondecreasingness, we must have z = 0, which would
delete the link from Si to T1, a contradiction.
Suppose that Sj ⊆ Si. Again by nondecreasingness, x
j
l = 0, which would delete the
links from Sj to any set in C containing r. This contradicts the definition of Sj .
Suppose finally that Si and Sj are incomparable. Observe that by nondecreasingness,
all supersets of Si, in particular S ∪K, must be connected to T1 as Si is, i.e., the com-
ponent t in (A1(1S∪K), . . . , An(1S∪K)) must be some z
′ ≥ z > 0. But since the number of
transitions is at most 2k, this must be at the expense of some component xS∪Kl in K to
be 0. Since Sj ⊆ S∪K, it follows from nondecreasingness that necessarily the component
xjl in (A1(1Sj), . . . , An(1Sj)) must be zero too, contradicting the definition of Sj.
(ii) Let us examine first the case of terminal classes which are not cycles. By the above
result, these classes have 2k sets, with at most 2k transitions for each set, this number
being attained for at least one set. If S, S ∪ K are the smallest and largest sets of the
29
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.89
class, we know that for each S ′ in the class the vector x = (A1(1S′), . . . , An(1S′)) has the
form (1S, x1 · · ·xk︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
, 0 · · ·0).
Suppose that all players in Ai are weakly essential. Then for any j 6= i, Ai(1{j}) > 0,
therefore by nondecreasingness of Ai, Ai(1S′) > 0 for all S
′ ∋ j and S ′ 6∋ i. Hence S ′
cannot be the greatest element of a terminal class since the vector x would not have the
right form. Since any j 6= i is weakly essential, it turns out that only {i} can be the
greatest element of a terminal class, and we are back to the case k = 1 (Theorem 1).
The above argument does not work for cyclic classes. For example, with n = 3,
S = {1, 2} and S ′ = {1, 3}, the fact that A1 or A2 or A3 has all weakly essential players
does not contradict the fact that {S, S ′} is a cyclic terminal class. However, since terminal
cyclic classes has always transitions with probability 1, if S belongs to the class, Ai(1S) is
either 0 or 1. Now S cannot be N nor ∅ since these are already terminal states. However,
if all players in Ai are essential we have Ai(1S) 6= 0, 1 for all S 6= N, ∅.
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